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BOOK REVIEW
STATUS, CONTRACT AND COVENANT
Reviewed by Margaret F. Brinigt
A REViEw OF Family Law and the Pursuit of Intimacy by Milton C.
Regan, Jr.
INTRODUCTION
For many years, I have taught family law from a contracts perspec-
tive. Increasingly, this approach has made me uneasy because reduc-
ing family law to a nexus of contracts seems to present only a partial
picture.1 Milton Regan 2 illuminates my discomfort in his new book
Family Law and the Pursuit of Intimacy.3 He suggests that concentrating
on individuality, as we must in studying contracts, causes us to lose
sight of the intimacy that makes family relationships worthwhile. In-
stead, he advocates returning to a world where both contract and a
redefined status model coexist. For Regan, status is shorthand for all
things of value in a family that are lost in the contractual frame, espe-
cially the interdependence that creates a sense of responsibility.4 In
arguing for a return to intimacy, he draws upon an impressive body of
social science literature and paints a picture that is sensitive to every-
one's feelings and to groups who might object to the use of the vener-
able term "status."
Like much of the communitarian literature, Regan's book sets a
mood rather than providing an agenda. It examines what the family
looked like in its "golden age" and how those notions, designed to
foster intimacy, have changed in the late twentieth century. Regan is
particularly effective in showing how these changes alienate and re-
t Professor of Law, George Mason University. I would like to thank Lloyd Cohen and
Carl Schneider for their helpful suggestions, Bryan Beier for his valuable research assist-
ance and comments, and the Sarah Scaife Foundation for its financial support.
1 I cannot, of course, claim to be the first to notice the problem. See, e.g., CAROL
WEISBROD, THE BOuNDAiEs OF UTOPIA 186-99 (1980); Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discourse
and the Transformation of American Family Law, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1803, 1832 (1985). My
position, however, is unusual among law and economics scholars. Cf. Lloyd Cohen, Mar-
riage, Divorce, and Quasi-Rents; or, "I Gave Him the Best Years of My Life, 16J. LEGAL STUD. 267
(1987) (noting that although specific performance of marital duties may be possible, the
essential spirit will not be there).
2 Regan is an Associate Professor of aw at Georgetown Law Center.
3 MILTON C. REGAN, JL, FAMILY LAW AND THE PuRsurr OF INTImAcY (1993).
4 REGAN, supra note 3, at 4.
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move us as people from any real context while simultaneously promot-
ing individuality. Regan's descriptions and attention to details of past
and present families make wonderful reading. The book, however,
does not provide any real solutions to the lack of intimacy he finds. In
the end, though the reader may understand the social criticism and
grasp the problems presented, she does not have a clear sense of how
to remedy these problems.
Although his criticism of the contract model is effective, Regan's
analysis falls short precisely because he strives for fairness and sensitiv-
ity. In assuming a defensive posture, he dilutes a powerful analogy to
avoid criticism by feminists and gay rights advocates. Regan quickly
points out the weakness of status as describing intimacy: historically,
status connoted hierarchy, male dominance, and Victorian attitudes.
However, Regan assures us that status need not be so encumbered.
Regan advocates a refined status by using new default terms for fami-
lies that would encourage security and intimacy, and discourage ine-
quality. Under this model of status, the American family could then
recapture only the golden parts of an earlier era.
Other possible routes for inquiry exist. We could admit the fail-
ure of contract and simply return to our grandparents' model for fam-
ilies.5 Before World War II, the typical American household could be
characterized by a husband who earned wages in the labor force, a
wife who maintained the home and cared for the couple's children,
and the three or four children who lived with them. Despite the at-
tractiveness that this doctrine might possess, however, we would un-
doubtedly fail to stuff the genies of sexual equality and individual
choice back into their bottle.
Alternatively, we could accept Regan's premise that the contract
perspective has problems and search for another paradigm. We
could, for instance, employ the ancient term "covenant" to describe
the bonds between husband and wife, parent and child. The cove-
nant concept lacks the sexist connotations of status, but even more
than status it links two individuals unconditionally and permanently. 6
5 By returning to our grandparents' model, I mean that we could abandon no-fault
divorce, remove incentives for women's participation in the job market, and return to gen-
der-based custody presumptions. I discuss the difference between the "grandparents'
model" and the late twentieth-century model in Margaret F. Brinig & Steven M. Grafton,
Marriage and Opportunism, 23J. LEGAL STUD. 869, 875-81 (1994).
6 I am not the only recent author to examine the idea of covenant. Janet Moore, in
Covenant and Feminist Reconstructions of Subjectivity Within Theories of Justice, 55 LAw & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 159, 167-89 (Summer 1992), uses the covenant paradigm as a foil for eco-
nomic man, much as Regan has used status. Moore writes in general jurisprudential terms
rather than talking about family law. She provides many more examples from Old Testa-
ment literature than I have included here. She begins her analysis by looking at criticism
of the writing of Thomas Hobbes, seventeenth-century originator of the individualist social
contract theory. Id. at 163-64. Hobbes opined that one should "consider men.., like
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This concept, however, has some problems. Perhaps, like Regan, we
ignore covenant because we encounter it in settings that are religious
or archaic. Moreover, the covenant traits of faithfulness and perma-
nency might make us uncomfortable in a time when the marriage
promise "until death do us part" only works half the time and when
even children can divorce their parents.7
An example drawn from Regan's book illustrates the difference
between contract, status, and covenant. Regan's conclusion features a
hypothetical married man who has gradually become more involved
with his work and less involved with his wife and daughter. He is con-
templating divorce, and Regan notes that modem society promotes
the message that "ultimately Dad's involvement with his family is a
matter of personal choice."8 The modem marriage, and even father-
hood, becomes a matter of contract to be honored only if there is no
better alternative. Regan suggests that family law should provide an
alternative-a vision of a person in context or relationship. 9 This is
status, which in this case would, at a minimum, cause the hypothetical
man "to think very carefully about the ramifications of what he does"
for his wife and daughter. 10 Yet however legally difficult it may be to
extricate himself from his family relationships, the man can take this
step in Regan's relational or status-based family. A covenant, however,
even more than a diamond," is forever.12 Even if the couple divorces,
mushrooms, come to full maturity, without all kind of engagement to each other."
Thomas Hobbes, Philosophical Rudiments Concerning Government and Society, in 2 THE ENG-
LISH WORKS OF THOMAS HOBBES 109 (William Molesworth ed., 1966). Moore notes that
"Hobbes focused intensely on the meaning and history of covenant in Books II and III of
Leviathan." Moore, supra, at 167.
7 See, e.g., Kingsley v. Kingsley, 623 So. 2d 780 (Fla. 1993); Twigg v. Mays, No. 88-
4489-CA-01, 1993 WL 330624 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug. 18, 1993).
8 REGAN, supra note 3, at 187.
9 Id. Regan admits that the process of recreating intimacy is "less direct than the way
the law may operate in other areas of life." Id. However, that process is critically important
because intimacy promotes "obedience to the unenforceable." Bruce C. Hafen, The Consti-
tutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Privacy-Balancing the Individual and Social
Interests, 81 MicH. L. REv. 463, 476 (1983).
10 REGAN, supra note 3, at 186. If he thinks not only of himself, but also of his family,
he may choose to stay rather than divorce. In economic terms, his actions involve external-
ities: because of their context, they necessarily affect others. Cf Ronald H. Coase, The
Problem of Social Cos4 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960) (absent transaction costs, parties will adjust
their activity level to reach the efficient amount; examples of this are railroads affecting
farmers by burning crops, ranchers affecting farmers because of cattle damage, and factory
pollution affecting a neighboring laundry).
11 "A diamond is forever" has long been the slogan of DeBeers, the South African
diamond exporting monopoly. See Margaret F. Brinig, Rings and Promises, 6 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 203, 206 (1990).
12 See infra part II. For the time being, I will define covenant as a particularly formal
type of promise, similar to the promise under oath. Geoffrey P. Miller, Contracts of Genesis,
22J. LEGAL STUD. 15, 24 (1993) ("It formalizes and bonds a promise by invoking the deity
as witness or even as cobeneficiary of the promise."). Further, a covenant "signifies the
restrictions on liberty inherent in the social construction of identity." Moore, supra note 6,
1994] 1575
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vestiges of their relationship remain, particularly if there are children.
A family covenant, much like a promise "running with the land," can-
not ever completely dissolve. The parent remains a parent even when
the children have left home and have families of their own.
In proposing a covenant alternative, I suggest that we can reassess
the problems of family as contract without the baggage of status. This
review begins by examining Regan's picture of the family. In the next
sections, I pose some questions that he leaves unanswered, describe
the alternative model of covenant, and, like Regan, reexamine the
family, this time using the new framework of covenant. Finally, I con-
clude by addressing some of the doubts left lingering after reading
Regan's very provocative book.
I
A GUIDED TOUR THROUGH FAMILYL WAND THE PuIsruT
OF A IAT IA CY
In his introduction, Regan contrasts contract with status. He
stresses that a contract requires neutrality and is therefore not useful
for a collective or normative view.' 3 He calls the person viewed in
contractual terms the "acontextual self" because such a person is con-
sidered without regard for his or her social relationships. 14 It follows
that private life becomes the domain of the individual rather than that
of the family.15
Unlike Regan, other scholars focus on the individual actor within
the family. Marriage or parenting under the consequent contractual
view becomes a collection of loosely affiliated individuals pursuing
at 183. In Moore's words, it "provides space for the meaningful exercise of individuality
and liberty." Id.
13 REGAN, supra note 3, at 2. This means, of course, that a contracts analysis cannot be
normative. However, the defenses of illegality and unconscionability certainly appear to be
societal value judgments about particular types of contracts. See, e.g., Watts v. Malatesta,
186 N.E. 210 (N.Y. 1933) (illegal wagering); New York Football Giants, Inc. v. Los Angeles
Chargers Football Club, Inc., 291 F.2d 471 (5th Cir. 1961) (upholding contract which al-
legedly violated N.CA.A. eligibility rules under "clean hands" doctrine); Duncan Kennedy,
Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference to Compulsoy
Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REv. 563, 633-46 (1982) (arguing that dis-
tributive and paternalist motives are pervasive in the fields of contract and tort, though the
rules are not characterized as such).
14 REGANI, supra note 3, at 2.
15 REG a, supra note 3, at 3. Historically, as Regan notes later in the book, courts have
considered privacy in terms of the family or home as opposed to the state or public. See,
e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (interpreting the Fourth Amendment as
only protecting certain areas, including a private home); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923) (upholding state law requiring that teachers instruct their students only in Eng-
lish); see also William J. Everett, Contract and Covenant in Human Community, 36 EMoRY UJ.
557, 559 (1987) (noting that contract's emphasis on the free will of individuals inevitably
leads us to construe human life in terms of intrinsically atomized persons who then con-
struct artificial, secondary relationships to pursue their individual advantage).
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their own aims and interests.1 6 In such a view, the law would inter-
vene only when someone else is harmed. 17 This vision of the self is
"fundamentally asocial."'8 While acknowledging that the contractual
model does add some important dimensions to our understanding of
family, Regan would replace a strictly contractarian framework with
one combining its useful elements with a status paradigm that encour-
ages "relational identity."19
His status hybrid would provide "a sense of oneself as defined in
part by relationships with others."20 He suggests that we learn from
the Victorians, who "were the first to confront the widespread influ-
ence of modernism." 21 These earlier Americans saw the family as a
network 6f interdependent roles, which they reinforced through legal
status.
2 2
Regan asserts that family law should provide not only "a neutral
framework for private ordering," but also a normative framework.23 It
"should promote a substantive moral vision of commitment and re-
sponsibility."24 In Regan's opinion, reintroducing status not only
would reduce alienation but would also have at least three beneficial
effects. First, increased responsibility and commitment by both par-
ties to a marriage may reduce the number of divorces. Second, when
divorce occurs, it need not lead to as much economic dislocation as it
does, particularly for custodial mothers.2 5 Finally, men may not see
16 See MARY ANN GLE n ON, RIGHTS TAIK THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF PoLrIcAL Dis-
COURSE 121-30 (1991) (discussing the deconstruction of the family into collections of
loosely affiliated indlividuals pursuing their own aims and interests). I wonder how often
this is true. Perhaps at myjob I am viewed as my own agent. However, in academia, I am a
George Mason professor, a label that carries its own set of connotations. After work, I
become the mother of my children. When I return to Wisconsin, my childhood home, I
become the daughter of my mother. All of these definitions are relational, rather than
merely descriptive, of me personally as a lawyer, a good cook, or a Midwesterner.
17 SeeJoHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 93 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., Hackett Publishing
Co. 1978) (1859).
18 REGAN, supra note 3, at 3.
19 Id. at 4. Regan is thus advocating a full circle, if Henry Maine was correct in his
description that law has moved from status to contract. HENRY S. MAINE, ANcmT LAw 163-
65 (1863).
20 REGAN, supra note 3, at 4. See also MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE:
INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMEmicAN LAW 267-311 (1990) (pointing out the dangers to
family members who have lacked power-women and children-in adopting either a
rights-based approach that ignores historical difference or a relational approach that de-
nies them the basic rights accorded to others).
21 REGAN, supra note 3, at 4.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id. Cf. MARTHA FiNEmAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQuALrry31-35 (1991) (discussing result
equality); Martha Fineman, Implementing Equality: Ideology, Contradiction and Social Change,
1983 Wis. L. REv. 789, 826-42 (criticizing the rule equality model).
25 See, e.g., the research reviewed in Lee E. Teitelbaum, Legal Regulation and Reform
Divorce, Custody, Gender and the Limits of the Law: On Dividing the Child, 92 MICH. L. REv. 180,
1994] 1577
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fatherhood as an occasion of loss26 -the loss of freedom to act with-
out constraint.
Already we can see the strengths and weakness of Regan's work.
In criticizing contract and advocating greater moral responsibility,
Regan avoids making certain judgments. For example, his work is
carefully neutral about such diverse topics as law and economics, femi-
nism, and same sex relationships. He discusses the topics of status
and morality at length, while referring to religion only in passing.27
However, his ultimate goals, strengthening the family,2 8 reinventing
fatherhood,2 9 and reawakening community, deserve only praise.
A. The Victorian Construction of Intimacy
During the Victorian age, men and women operated in "differ-
ent spheres"30 that we also call "household production" and "the la-
bor market."31 Husband and wife each had a distinct role to
189 & n.5 (1994) and particularly ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, DIVmDING
THE CHILD: SOCIAL AND LEGAL DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY (1992).
26 REGAN, supra note 3, at 5. The loss is currently like the loss of bachelorhood we
celebrate through raucous parties the evening before a wedding takes place. Regan's idea
that modem fatherhood is not as rich as it can or should be is foreshadowed in Jerry W.
McCant, The Cultural Contradiction of Fathers as Nonparents, 21 FAM. L.Q. 127 (1987) (discuss-
ing cultural discrimination against fathers as providers and protectors of their wives and
children in a society which embraces the tough, macho he-man). See also Michael E. Lamb,
The Changing Roles of Fathers, in THE FATHER'S ROLE: APPLIED PERSPECrrVES 3 (Michael E.
Lamb ed., 1986) (discussing the "new fatherhood"); Norma Radin & Graeme Russell, In-
creased Father Participation and Child Development Outcomes, in FATHERHOOD AND FAMILY PoL-
icy 191 (Michael E. Lamb & Abraham Sagi eds., 1983) (compiling data which
demonstrates that unique relationships between father involvement and child develop-
ment emerge when fathers make caring for children an important activity in their lives).
27 Regan, supra note 3, at 32, 58, 176. Carl Schneider noted that because religious
views are less universally and strongly held, statements of moral aspiration linked to reli-
gion have slipped from legal discourse. Schneider, supra note 1, at 1845.
28 REGAN, supra note 3, at 5. See also Bruce C. Hafen, The Family as an Entity, 22 U.C.
DAVIs L. REv. 865 (1989) (advocating legal reforms that will help restore a sense of caring
commitment to family relationships).
29 REGAN, supra note 3, at 5. See also Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A
Child-Centered Perspective on Parents' Rights, 14 CARDozo L. REv. 1747 (1993) (calling for a
renaissance of gestational fathering).
30 Barbara Welter, The Cult of True Womanhood: 1820-1860, 18 AM. Q. 151, 153 (1966).
31 GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY 14-37 (1981) [hereinafter TREATISE ON
FAMILY]. See also Yoram Ben-Porath, Economics and the Family-Match or Mismatch, 20 J.
ECON. LIT. 52 (1982) (reviewing TREATISE ON FAMILY, supra); Margaret F. Brinig, The Law
and Economics of No-Fault Divorce, 26 FAM. L.Q. 453 (1993) (reviewing ALLAN M. PAREMAN,
NO-FAULT DIVORCE: WHAT WENT WRONG? (1992)); Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the
Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARv. L. REv. 1497 (1983) (discussing the
market-family dichotomy). Ben-Porath asserts that biological differences between men and
women are the source of Becker's analysis of comparative advantage, leading to a home-
oriented allocation of time and composition of human capital for women, and ultimately
lower market wages. Ben-Porath, supra, at 53. See also Gary S. Becker, Nobel Lecture: The
Economic Way of Looking at Behavior, 101 J. POL. ECON. 385, 394-98 (1993) (discussing gen-
der division of labor).
1578 [Vol. 79:1573
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play.3 2 Although he notes the problems with this gender differentia-
tion, Regan does not consider the average Victorian "sexually re-
pressed, emotionally remote, [or] hypocritical."33 He argues that the
Victorian reliance on status in family law was part of an effort to "pre-
serve a relational sense of self in the face of perceived atomizing ten-
dencies of modernization." 34
Nineteenth-century family law "fostered a vision of the family as a
set of reciprocal roles" in which the individual's relationship to family
members defined proper behavior.35 Thus a person's legal identity in
the family, or status, made her "subject to a set of publicly imposed
expectations largely independent of [her] preferences."36 Any at-
32 REGAN, supra note 3, at 6. Regan adopts without question the contemporary wis-
dom that Victorians thought men and women by nature were fit for different pursuits.
Early Supreme Court decisions opined such a notion. See, e.g., Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S.
130, 141-42 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring). Perhaps women themselves began this no-
tion as simply a means to an end. The hours and working conditions in factories made
work outside the home, farm, or cottage industry an unattractive alternative for the mar-
ried woman. See infra note 55. It is possible to argue, even for more modem couples, that
although parties are equally talented when they marry, they later may adopt specialized
roles within the marriage. These "efficient" marriages resemble the Victorian separate
spheres. See, e.g., ALLEN PARKMAN, No FAULT DIVORCE, WHAT WENT WRONG? (1992) (de-
scription of Becker's model); Becker, supra note 31; Brinig, supra note 31, at 456-58.
While Victorian reformer Catharine Beecher thought some hierarchy in the family
was necessary, it was not based on a man's inherent superiority, but rather in the spirit of a
manufacturing firm:
For this purpose, it is needful that certain relations be sustained, that in-
volve the duties of subordination.... The superior in certain particulars is
to direct, and the inferior is to yield obedience. Society could never go
forward, harmoniously, nor could any craft or profession be successfully
pursued, unless these superior and subordinate relations be instituted and
sustained.
CATHARINE BEECHER, A TREATISE ON DOMESTIC ECONOMY 2 (Schocken Books 1977) (1841).
See also ROSALIND ROSENBERG, BEYOND SEPARATE SPHERES: INTu.ErcruAL RooTS OF MODERN
FEMINISM 147-77 (1982) (evaluating Beechers' sentiment and tracing the evolution of a
more modem attitude). At least one seventeenth-century scholar thought that women
were created with equal dignity to men in God's eyes. See FRANCOIS POULLAIN DE LA BARRE,
THE WOMAN As GOOD As THE MAN OR, THE EQUALrYy OF BOTH SEXES 122 (A.L. trans., 1677
& Gerald MacLean ed., 1988) (1673). Nancy Cott argues that the notion of a "woman's
sphere" allowed women to resolve previously ascribed inferiority by accentuating the differ-
ence between the sexes. NANCY F. COTT, THE BONDS OF WOMANHOOD: "WOMAN'S SPHERE"
IN NEW ENGLAND, 1780-1835, at 202-04 (1977).
33 REGAN, supra note 3, at 7.
34 Id. at 8. Thus the market's liberal virtues of individualism and competition could
be kept separate from the family virtues of altruism and cooperation. See CATHARINE E.
BEECHER & HARRIET BEECHER STOwE, THE AMERICAN WOMAN'S HOME 17-20 (1869). Several
scholars criticize this theme. See, e.g., Linda Kerber, Separate Spheres, Female Worlds, Woman's
Place: The Rhetoric of Women's Histo"y, 75J. AM. HIsr. 9, 20-21 (1988); Olsen, supra note 31,
at 1504-05, 1520-21.
35 REGAN, supra note 3, at 9.
36 Id. The values of the family were not confined to the home, but ultimately would
extend to all of American society. As Beecher wrote in A TREATISE ON DOMESTIC ECONOMY.
The success of democratic institutions, as is conceded by all, depends
upon the intellectual and moral character of the mass of the people....
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tempt to alter these "standard form" rights and duties was unenforce-
able.37 Breach of these duties did not give rise to an independent
cause of action,38 but sometimes would give the injured spouse the
right to divorce. 9
Of course, the history of the American family does not begin
with the Victorians. As Regan notes, in colonial America the family
was a "basic unit in an interconnected chain" rather than a dis-
tinct grouping. 40 Because the family was a crucial economic
[T] he moral and intellectual character of the young is committed mainly to
the female hand.... Let the women of a country be made virtuous and
intelligent, and the men will certainly be the same....
BEECHER, supra note 32, at 13. The concept echoes Aristotle's PoLITIcs, as described in
HENRY W. SPIEGEL, THE GROWTH OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT 25 (2d ed. 1983).
Catharine Beecher's version of the homemaker's role was that women were the moral
hope of the nation. "American women! Will you save your country?" she wrote. See MARY
P. RYAN, CRADLE OF THE MIDDLE CLASS: THE FAMILY IN ONEIDA COUNTY, NEW YORK, 1790-
1865, at 40 (1981); see generally Susan Hill Lindley, Woman's Profession in the Life and
Thought of Catharine Beecher A Study of Religion and Reform 328 (1974) (unpublished
Ph.D. thesis, Duke University) (describing Beecher's view of the family and woman's role
in it as the "instruments of world salvation"); RYAN, supra, at 40 (showing how various prot-
estant groups form covenants to link themselves in a circle similar to a large family).
37 REGAN, supra note 3, at 10. Regan uses as an example a case where illegal cohabi-
tants sought to make marriage "strictly personal matter." Id. Perhaps a better example is
the series of cases in which modem married couples have tried to alter "essential elements"
of the marital contract. See, e.g., In reMarriage of Higgason, 516 P.2d 289, 296 (Cal. 1973)
(wife was liable for husband's support during the time they were living together); Favrot v.
Barnes, 332 So. 2d 873 (La. Ct App. 1976) (premarital understanding cannot amend or
repeal nature of marital obligations declared by statute).
38 See, e.g., State v. Rhodes, 61 N.C. 453 (1868) (no criminal assault and battery for
wife beating); McGuire v. McGuire, 59 N.W.2d 336, 341 (Neb. 1953) (no right to injunctive
relief when husband of means refused to provide wife with such amenities as new clothes
and indoor plumbing).
39 REGAN, supra note 3, at 12 (citing JOEL P. BISHOP, NEW COMMENTARIES ON MAR-
RIAGE, DIVORCE, AND SEPARATION 220 (1891)). Bishop, a nineteenth-century commentator,
called divorce an action for breach of duty (a tort) rather than for breach of contract. Id.
Cf June Carbone & Margaret F. Brinig, Rethinking Marriage: Feminist Ideology, Economic
Change, and Divorce Reform, 65 TULANE L. Ray. 953, 957-61 (1991) (portraying nineteenth-
century divorce not as a tort but as a breach of contract action, protecting women by
awarding what was essentially expectation damages in contract). This characterization
avoids Bishop's problem that restoring divorcing parties back to their premarital position
(reliance) "gives no damage for a wrong inflicted, and affords no restraint against breaches
of matrimonial duty." REGAN, supra note 3, at 12 (quoting BISHOP, supra, at 441).
40 REGAN, supra note 3, at 17. See alsoJEAN-LouIs FLANDRIN, FAMILIES IN FORMER TIMES:
KINSHIP, HOUSEHOLD AND SEXUALITY IN EARLY MODERN FRANCE 173 (Richard Southern
trans., 1976) [hereinafter FAMILIES IN FORMER TIMES] (discussing the relatively undifferenti-
ated roles of men and women). This view was not accepted by more patrician Americans.
Thomas Jefferson, who in 1787 on his tour of southern France saw women and children
'carrying heavy burthens [sic], and labouring with the hough. [sic] This is an unequivocal
indication of extreme poverty. Men, in a civilised country, never expose their wives and
children to labour above their force or sex, as long as their own labour can protect them
from it." Thomas Jefferson, Notes of a Tour into the Southern Parts of France, &c., in 11
THE PAPERS OF THOMASJEFFERSON 1 JANUARY TO 6 AUGUST 1787, at 415 (Julian P. Boyd ed.,
1955).
1580 [Vol. 79:1573
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unit,41 individual emotional fulfillment was not essential to the colo-
nial household. Work took place in the home and in the surrounding
fields so that it was an extension of the home.42 Gender roles were
indistinct as compared to those in Europe. 43
The physical separation of work and home into separate domains
or spheres pulled the early American home into the modem era.44 In
contrast to the cynical and self-centered working world of the early
capitalists, the Victorian home offered an asylum and a place where
the tired and defiled worker could be rejuvenated.45 The family,
headed by its priestess wife,46 was to mold character in all its members
by inculcating an ethic of duty and self-restraint that could hold ego-
ism in check.4 7
Although the Victorian family took on some important new func-
tions, in some senses it was less of a community. As Regan notes, the
members of the household were no longer "'meshed together by
common productive property and shared work experience,'" but
rather were involved with deliberate decisions, such as whether to fi-
nance education or training.48 There was thus greater subjectivity and
a tendency away from communal norms. In fact, many of our family-
centered holiday traditions date from this period49 because of the
need for common values and goals.
41 REGAN, supra note 3, at 17. It is still crucial today, of course, although not in a
market production sense. In colonial America, marriages were particularly important to
secure social standing because wealth was closely tied to land holdings. See, e.g., Margaret
F. Brinig & June Carbone, The Reliance Interest in Marriage and Divore 62 TuLNE L. REV.
855, 862-63 (1988); Charles Donahue, Jr., Mhat Causes Fundamental Legal Ideas? Marital
Property in England and France in the Thirteenth Centuy, 78 MICH. L. REv. 59, 81 (1979).
42 REGAN, supra note 3, at 18.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 19. See also CATHARiNE BEECHER, A TREATISE ON DOMESTIc EcoNom" ix-x
(Katheryn Kish Sklar's introduction to the paperback edition); Corr, supra note 32, at 67-
68; KATHERNv KSH SKLAR, CATHARwE BEEcHER: A STUDY IN AMERiCAN DoMFSrncrry 193-94
(1973) [hereinafter AmE.itcN DoMEsncrIY].
45 REcAN, supra note 3, at 21.
46 See, e.g., M.AY RYAN, THE EMPIRE OF THE MoTHER: AMF.UcAN WrriNG AaoTrr Do-
MEsricriy 1830-1860, at 96 (1982); SKLAR, supra note 44, at 113 (recounting the general
bargain being struck in society limiting women's participation in society in exchange for
total control over the home). See also BEECHER & STOWE, supra note 34, at 222 (describing
the married woman as the "sovereign of an empire").
47 REGAN, supra note 3, at 24-25. See generally Lindley, supra note 36, at 328 (quoting
Catharine Beecher's statement that woman's duty was to "train immature, weak, and igno-
rant creatures").
48 REGAN, supra note 3, at 23 (quoting RvAN, supra note 36, at 185).
49 REGAN, supra note 3, at 26-27. "[T]he nineteenth century featured the appearance
of such family oriented celebrations as... the birthday cake, the Christmas tree, Christmas
presents, Christmas caroling, and the Thanksgiving turkey." Id. (citing STEVEN MnrrZ &
SUSAN KELLOGG, DoMESTIc REvoLurONs: A SocLAL HISTORY OF AmmucAN FAmY LE 48
(1988)).
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Regan does not consider that it may have been entirely rational
for only one spouse to participate in the labor force. Perhaps it is thus
unnecessarily defensive for him to equate the Victorian home and
market dichotomy with the subjugation of women. In their recent pa-
per, Jeremy Atack and Fred Bateman present new evidence that the
average workday in the United States, as late as 1880, was ten hours.50
However, this average includes shorter days for work in which women
probably could not have participated.51 For example, mine, lumber
and construction workers all worked less than ten hour days.52 In the
food, clothing, and textile industries, which involved women, at least
ten hour workdays were required. 53 Participants in the food industry
generally averaged more than eleven hours per day.5 4 During the de-
cades before 1880, the period when the doctrine of "separate spheres"
developed, work days were even longer. It was probably impossible
for a woman with family and household responsibilities to work at
least ten hours per day outside her home.55 Indeed, even today with
modern appliances, such a work schedule is unusual.
Regan asserts that for women, " '[n] ineteenth-century American
society provided but one socially respectable, nondeviant role for wo-
men-that of loving wife and mother.' -56 It is accurate to limit this
comment to the middle class. In rural families, respectable single wo-
men worked throughout the nineteenth century at New England tex-
tile mills, helping support their families until they found appropriate
50 How Long Was the Workday in 1880?, 52J. ECON. Hisr. 129, 137-38 (1992).
51 Id. at 139.
52 Id. at 140.
53 Id.
54 This was not true in the South, where workdays averaged less than 10 hours. Id. at
138-39.
55 A contemporary observer portrayed the clothing worker as being:
With fingers weary and worn,
With eyelids heavy and red,
A Woman sat, in unwomanly rags,
Plying her needle and thread-
Stitch! stitch! stitch!
In poverty, hunger and dirt,
And still with a voice of dolorous pitch
She sang the "Song of the Shirt!"
Thomas Hood, "The Song of the Shirt"
Thomas Hood, The Song of the Shirt, PUNCH (1843) in 2 ELIZABETH K HELSINGER ET AL.,
THE WOMAN QUESTION: SOCIETY AND LrERATURE IN BRITAIN AND AMERICA 1837-1883, at
115 (1983). Helsinger and her co-authors quote a woman as writing, "H.W. has three
children; leaves home at five on Monday; does not return till Saturday at seven; has then so
much to do for her children, that she cannot go to bed before three o'clock on Sunday
morning." Id. at 123.
56 RECAN, supra note 3, at 28 (quoting CAROLL SMITH-ROSENBERG, DISORDERLY CON-
DUCT: VISIONS OF GENDER IN VICTORIAN AMERICA 213 (1985)).
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husbands.57 Working class women, and particularly immigrants,
worked even after they married; although sometimes their work, such
as laundering, could be done in their homes.58 A movement pio-
neered by Catharine Beecher, also renown for her contributions to
the "separate spheres" ideology, created new "women's places" in
schools and hospitals. 59 These respectable, middle-class positions re-
-57 See, e.g., THOMAS DUBLIN, WOMEN AT WORK: THE TRANSFORMATION OF WORK AND
COMMUNITY IN LowELL, MASSACHUSEmrs, 1826-60 (1979); see also W. ELLioTT & MARY M.
BROWNLEE, WOMEN IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY-. A DOCUMENTARY HIsToRY 1675 TO 1929, at
14-15 (1976) (collection of essays showing how often "normal" single women worked to
help their families). Lower class female occupations such as carding, spinning, and weav-
ing were transferred from home to factory, while for middle class women, newly gained
time allowed them to become "ladies." Gerda Lerner, The Lady and the Mill Girk Changes in
the Status of Women in the Age ofJackson, in OUR AMERICAN SISrERS: WOMEN IN AMERICAN LIn
AND THOUGHT 82, 89 (Jean E. Friedman et al. eds., 4th ed. 1987) [hereinafter OUR AMERI-
CAN SISTREm].
58 See, e.g., DUBLIN, supra note 57, at 4 (women in cottage industries);Joan Wilson, The
Illusion of Change: Women and the American Revolution, in OUR AMERICAN SisTERs, supra note
57, at 76 (arguing that women were valued as equal economic partners because of the
severe labor shortage in the American colonies). However, by the mid-nineteenth century,
the working alternatives were rather dismal:
Meantime, domestic service-disgraced, on one side, by the stigma of our
late slavery, and, on the other, by the influx into our kitchens of the un-
cleanly and ignorant-is shunned by the self-respecting and well educated,
many of whom prefer either a miserable pittance or the career of vice to
this fancied degradation. Thus comes the overcrowding in all avenues for
woman's work, and the consequent lowering of wages to starvation prices
for long protracted toils .... Factory girls must stand ten hours or more,
and consequently in a few years debility and diseases ensue, so that they can
never rear healthy children.
BEECHER & STOWE, supra note 34, at 570.
59 AMERICAN DoMEsTcrrY, supra note 44, at 217. See also Martha Minow, "Forming Un-
derneath Everything That Grows:" Toward a Histor of Family Law, 1985 Wis. L. Ruv. 819 (dis-
cussion of Beecher along with several other "unnoticed" early American women whose
lives provide a backdrop for much of American legal history). After reading a good deal of
her writing and several books written about her, I am convinced that Beecher's choice of
an apparently subordinated position for women was correct. It was entirely rational for
married women in the nineteenth century to stay out of the labor market. Beecher's move-
ment undoubtedly sowed the seeds of the ultimate sexual revolution, since it stressed
higher education for women. Although physically she could not compete with her hus-
band in the factories of the nineteenth century, an educated women is now very competi-
tive in the information-based economy of today, one and a half centuries later.
John Stuart Mill, in his famous SUBJECrION OF WOMEN, first published in 1869, criti-
cized the political authority of men over women. Yet he did not suggest that the married
woman work outside the home, for:
If, in addition to the physical suffering of bearing children, and the whole
responsibility of their care and education in early years, the wife undertakes
the careful and economical application of the husband's earnings to the
general comfort of the family, she takes not only her fair share, but usually
the larger share, of the bodily and mental exertion required by their joint
existence. If she undertakes any additional portion, it seldom relieves her
from this, but only prevents her from performing it properly.... In an
otherwisejust state of things, it is not, therefore, I think, a desirable custom,
that the wife should contribute by her labour to the income of the family.
JOHN STUART MILL, THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN 483 (Oxford University Press 1975) (1869).
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quired higher education and were particularly suited to those women
who chose never to marry.60
Regan is entirely correct, however, when he states that " '[w] ork
by the husband was a responsibility owed to the wife, and nothing
more detrimental could be said about a man than that he did not
support his wife and family.' "61 Nonsupport was such a grave offense
that many states made it a cause of action for divorce. 2
As Regan notes, the new role identification which defined dis-
tinct spheres for husbands and wives also fostered the couple's duty to
maintain emotional bonds.63 In marriage, couples needed to tran-
scend themselves and their own wants. By investing marriage with
traditional religious symbols of selflessness, marriage in one sense re-
turned to its original sacramental status.6 4 This sacramental view of-
fered a vision of connection during a period when rapid
industrialization caused real individual anxiety. Regan uses the exam-
ple of the "ministerial" letters written by Harriet Beecher Stowe to her
husband, himself an evangelical clergyman. 65 In constantly urging
him to spend more time examining his own conscience and working
towards self-purification, Stowe revealed her own strong religious
background. 66
B. Individuality and Self
In the chapters that form the heart of his book, Regan argues
that focusing on individual choice affects not only our families, but
60 Catharine Beecher made this choice after her fiance, a Yale science professor, died
in a shipwreck. AMERICAN DOMESrICrY, supra note 44, at 37. She wrote, "[n]o woman is
forced to obey any husband but the one she chooses for herself, nor is she obliged to take a
husband, if she prefers to remain single." BEECHER, supra note 32, at 3.
61 REGAN, supra note 3, at 28 (quoting ROBERT GmswoLD, FAMILY AND DIVORCE IN CALI-
FORNIA, 1850-1890, at 101 (1982)).
62 States continuing to have such statutes include Arkansas, Aw. CODE ANN. § 9-12-
301(8) (Michie 1993); Maine, ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 691 (West 1981); Rhode Is-
land, R.I. GEN. LAws § 15-5-2 (1988) (action brought by wife only); Tennessee, TENN. CODE
ANN. § 36-4-102(3) (1991) (action brought by wife only); and Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
15, § 551(5) (1989).
63 REGAN, supra note 3, at 30.
64 Marriage was demoted from a sacrament to a favored institution by Martin Luther
and the reformers, such as John Calvin, who followed him. JAMES A. BRUNDAGE, LAW, SEX,
AND CHRISTIAN Socrry IN MEDIEVAL EUROPE 553 (1987). As Catharine Beecher wrote:
"Now the family state is instituted to educate our race to the Christian character.., to train
the young to be followers of Christ, Woman is its chief minister, and the work to be done is
the most difficult of all .... " CATHAINE BEECHER, WOMAN's PROFESSION AS MOTHER AND
EDUCATOR WITH VIEWS IN OPPOSITION TO WOMAN SUFFRAGE 175 (1872). See Lindley, supra
note 36, at 328 (discussion of Beecher's view of the family).
65 REGAN, supra note 3, at 32.
66 Harriet was the daughter of Lyman Beecher, a Calvinist Evangelical minister. All
her brothers were ministers, and she married one. Gerald Carson, Catherine Beecher, 5 NEW
ENG. GALAXY 3 (1964).
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also our very selves. He begins by noting that in the twentieth century,
private means personal, not family-related. 67 Because "private" means
"personal," a much more subjective term, family law no longer em-
bodies a moral vision 68 but instead aims to prevent harm to family
members.69 There is no consensus about standards of behavior in
families. Instead, we see a person as an individual, not as husband or
wife, parent or child.70
This individual member of a modem family may no longer enjoy
many of the functions that the family used to provide7' because the
family is no longer the repository of shared culture. For example,
before about 1920, the family was the site of courtship.72 The family
served a role besides" 'gratifying people's psychological needs,' "-' be-
cause serious young couples sought parental approval before consid-
ering marriage.
67 REGAN, supra note 3, at 34-39. This trend toward subjectivity can also be seen in the
modem business firm. While in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries busi-
nesses were often identified with families, they have recently become much more imper-
sonal. See, e.g., ALYRD D. CHANDLER, JR., SCALE AND SCOPE: THE DYNAMics OF INDUSTRIAL
CAPITAUSM 291-95 (1990) (noting that the family association still characterizes British, as
opposed to American and German, firms); Yoram Ben-Porath, The F-Connection: Families,
Friends, and Finms and the Organization of Exchange, 6 POPULATION & DEv. Riv. 1 (1980)
(discussing the role of transactions in identity).
68 REGAN, supra note 3, at 36. Cf. Carl E. Schneider, The Channelling Function in Family
Law, 20 HosmmA L. REv. 495, 498 (1992) (family law serves a "channelling function," and
creates and supports desirable social institutions).
69 REGAN, supra note 3, at 36.
70 Id. at 39. See also Schneider, supra note 68, at 500-01 (models of marriage and
parenthood). I agree with this analysis up to a point. For example, in asserting their indi-
vidual identities as apart from their husbands, many married women have moved from
"Mrs. John Smith" to "Nancy Smith" and, more recently, to "Nancy Jones" (using the
maiden name or birth surname). See, e.g., Stuart v. Board of Supervisors of Elections, 295
A.2d 223 (Md. 1972) (married woman filed petitions challenging action of county board of
elections canceling her registration to vote using her maiden name); Lassiter-Geers v.
Reichenbach, 492 A.2d 303 (Md.), cert. denied 474 U.S. 1019 (1985) (suit subsequent to
divorce to determine the surname of parties' child).
71 REGAN, supra note 3, at 53.
72 See BETH L. BAILEY, FROM FRONT PORCH TO BAcK SEAT. COURTSHIP IN TWENTIETH-
CENTURY AMERIcA (1988) (describing how "calling" became dating, a practice undertaken
almost exclusively outside the home setting, which focused to a greater extent on material-
ism); see also Willard Waller, The Rating and Dating Complex, 2 AM. Soc. REv. 727, 729-30
(1937) (discussing the dating hierarchy of an anonymous college).
73 REGAN, supra note 3, at 53 (quoting B. ADAMs, THE FAMILY- A SOCIOLOGICAL INTER-
PRETATION 95 (1975)). See also TREATISE ON FAMmY, supra note 31, at 237-42 (describing the
mutual help and insurance against a risky world that took place across generations in ex-
tended families).
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The modem person, as Regan puts it, links happiness with con-
sumption. 74 He reflects about how we use the term "lifestyle,"75 drawn
from the inherently transitory fashion world.76 The use of the term
suggests that we have made relationships contingent. Like partici-
pants in the futures market, we always look for a hedge in case a better
opportunity comes along.7 7 As Regan notes, our reliance on the fam-
ily to gratify psychological needs holds the seeds of its own destruc-
tion.78 We ground the family upon "inherently dynamic emotional
states."79 Since our emotions are not constant, Regan predicts that
spouses who can will discard their present spouses for presumably
more attractive opportunities.80
74 In a provocative paper, art historian Marian Wardle contrasts portraits of nine-
teenth- and twentieth-century man. Marian Wardle, "Domestic Bliss" Versus "Domestic
Blitz": The Family in American Art in the 1890s and 1990s, Paper presented at the Interna-
tional Society for Family Law North American Conference, in Moran, Wyoming (June 12,
1993) (on file with author). Like Regan, Wardle notes that, while the nineteenth-century
paintings embodied the concept of the ideal family as the Utopian retreat, the twentieth-
century photographs portray "a man alone, confronting his loneliness and isolation" while
surrounded by consumer goods, or a "daughter [who] has broken away from her mother,
although they both occupy the same domestic space." Id.
75 REGAN, supra note 3, at 62-63.
A few years ago, I examined a computer program called "Personal Lifestyles." The
software purported to allow couples to design their own cohabitation and antenuptial con-
tracts. It was particularly designed for unorthodox relationships: gay and lesbian couples,
"open marriages," and the like.
76 REGAN, supra note 3, at 62.
77 See Schneider, supra note 1, at 1848 (noting the phenomenon but calling it the
doctrine of "nonbinding commitments").
78 REGAN, supra note 3, at 67.
79 Id. The family then becomes little more than a long term contract subject to the
threat of "efficient breach" should the emotional life not seem satisfactory. See generally Ian
R. Macneil, Efficient Breach of Contract: Circles in the Sky, 68 VA. L. Ruv. 947 (1982) (discuss-
ing problems in efficient breach theory); Alan Schwartz, The Case for Specific Performance, 89
YALE L.J. 271 (1979) (arguing that specific performance should be a readily available rem-
edy for a breach of contract).
The same repugnance that many law students feel about cavalierly discarding contrac-
tual obligations where the original promisee is paid off somehow has not carried over to
marriages, except, perhaps, to the serial monogamy practiced by some Hollywood stars.
Economists Martin Zelder and Douglas Allen suggest that no-fault divorce may provide
more efficient exodus from less-than-satisfactory marriages. Martin Zelder, Inefficient Disso-
lutions as a Consequence of Public Goods: The Case of No-Fault Divorce, 22 J. LEGAL STuD. 503
(1994); Martin Zelder, The Economic Analysis of the Effect of No-Fault Divorce on theDivorce Rate
16 HARv.J.L. & PuB. POL. 241 (1993) (arguing no-fault divorce will increase divorce rate,
particularly among families who spend a higher proportion of their incomes on their chil-
dren); Douglas W. Allen, Divorce: What's at Fault For No-Fault?, Presentation to the Cana-
dian Law and Economics Association, in Toronto (Aug. 1992).
80 Indeed, two economists have separately written about the "trophy wife" phenome-
non: the wealthy businessmen who discards his wife of many years to marry a much
younger, and presumably more attractive woman. See William Bishop, Is He Married? Mar-
riage as Information, 34 U. ToRoNTo LJ. 245 (1984); Lloyd Cohen, Marriage, Divorce and
Quasi-Rents; Or, "I Gave Him the Best Years of My Life", 16J. LEGAL S-rUD. 267 (1987). Jack
Kent Cooke, owner of the Washington Redskins football team, has achieved notoriety for
his series of much younger wives. See Kitty Kelley, My Life With Jack, WASHINGTONIAN, Aug.
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C. Status, Self and Community
Regan carries his analysis further than claiming that postmodern-
ism threatens only the family. He states that the self in the
postmodern world is redefined so as to be perpetually transforming,
perpetually choosing.81 Although we seek happiness, in Regan's
postmodern world we are paradoxically doomed to eternal striving for
elusive perfection. Status offers an opportunity for happiness pre-
cisely because it restrains the "free play of subjectivity."8 2 The defini-
tion of roles that status provides therefore does not fetter, but rather
frees us.
Within the family, Regan suggests that status "proclaims that
some things can be taken for granted as long as a marriage lasts, and
that some obligations may remain even when a partner has decided to
leave."8 3 In other words, there must be enough content in marriage
that a spouse can rely on some things being constant throughout.
Some obligations, such as civility, coparenting, and financial support,
may remain even when one partner has decided to end the legal mar-
riage.8 4 The self is thus defined not in terms of choice, but in terms of
relationship to others.85
Paradoxically, "status . .. enhance Es] the potential for intimacy
precisely because it is impersonal."8 6 It contributes to the creation of
a unified self capable of making commitments and inspiring trust.
Status uses communal obligations to root the self in context, and thus
1988, at 78 (picture ofJack andJackJunior, both with "trophy wives"); see also Kozlowski v.
Kozlowski, 403 A.2d 902, 905 (N.J. 1979) (cohabitant abandoned his partner for a "trophy
wife" 30 years his junior).
81 REGAN, supra note 3, at 77. Regan argues that "[m]odernism envisions the authen-
tic self as a person defined by her capacity for growth and her receptivity to new experi-
ence." Id. One is reminded of the mythological travails of Sisyphus and his unhappy
reincarnation in ALBERT CAmus's LE MYTrE DE SISYPHE: EssAi SUR L'ABSURDE (1942), be-
cause reward and human dignity is found in effort and process, rather than progress.
82 REGAN, supra note 4, at 83. Here I think of St. Paul's passage in Galatians 5:1 that by
being in bondage to Christ, the Christian finds the greatest liberty: "Stand Fast therefore
in the liberty wherewith Christ has made us free, and be not entangled with the Yoke of
bondage."
83 REGAN, supra note 3, at 96. This, of course, protects those willing to make intimate
commitments. My colleague Lloyd Cohen reminds me of the scene from "Fiddler on the
Roof" in which Teyva asks Golda, his wife of many years, whether she loves him. Para-
phrasing her reply, she acts as though she loves him whether the emotion is there or not.
This corresponds with Regan's comment that "conduct reflecting interdependence is often
the best evidence of the partners' expectations." Id. at 125. See also infra notes 166-69 and
accompanying text.
84 REGAN, supra note 3, at 96. Regan argues that a view of the self in contract is acon-
textual. Id. at 90 (citing LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, CoNTRAcT LAW IN AMERICA 20-21 (1965)).
The "pure" theory of contract is grounded on the capacity to make a choice free of any
external restraints. Id. Even inequalities of bargaining power are merely the result of prior
individual choices rather than restraints on choice. Id. at 91.
85 Id. at 102.
86 Id. at 104 (referencing GEORGE H. ME.AD, MIND, SELF, AND SOCIETY (1934)).
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locates the self within forms of life in which it can act meaningfully as
an agent.
Having persuaded us that seeing the family in terms of status is
important, Regan continues by enlarging the definition of family. He
maintains that "the moral aspiration that marriage has expressed is
not heterosexual intimacy per se, but the more general vision of re-
sponsibility based on the cultivation of a relational sense of identity."87
In particular, in Chapter five, Regan extends the protection of inti-
macy to same-sex relationships.88 For Regan, the primary relational
values are intimacy and stability.8 9 He therefore would extend the
benefits of status to same-sex relationships while removing it from un-
married cohabitation. 90 However, he suggests that because stability
and intimacy are more prevalent in marriage, legal rules ought to
clearly distinguish between marriage and cohabitation: "A new model
of status would be sympathetic to the claim that the social interest in
promoting marriage justifies preserving a firm distinction between the
legal treatment of married and unmarried couples."91 Cohabitation is
frequently preferred because it avoids the obligations of marriage.
Since women in long term relationships have tended to rely less on
their own market incomes, and have invested more than their part-
ners in "household production," allowing cohabitation to replace mar-
ital obligations would also have a gendered impact.9 2 Regan would
87 Id. at 120.
88 Id. at 121. Regan notes the desire of many same-sex couples to cement their rela-
tionship through formal "commitment ceremonies." Id See, e.g., Susan Reed, et al., Love
Match No Mor4 PEOPLE MAcAziNE, July 8, 1991, at 28 (videotaping of cohabitation contract
between Martina Navratilova & Judy Nelson).
89 REGAN, supra note 3, at 173.
90 Id. at 122-28. Unmarried cohabitation arrangements tend to be less stable than
married ones, precisely because the partners do not wish to undertake the commitments of
marriage. Id. at 123. Regan would, in line with most modern jurisdictions, allow unmar-
ried cohabitants to enforce their express agreements. Id. at 125.
91 Id. at 123. See also Schneider, supra note 68, at 514-20 (describing the channeling
function family law could play in modem institutions of marriage and parenthood).
92 REGAN, supra note 3, at 124-25. Interestingly, all of the often-cited palimony cases
have been brought by women. See, e.g., Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976) (suit by
woman against man with whom she lived to enforce oral contract to distribute property);
Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204 (Ill. 1979) (suit brought by woman for equal division of
property acquired during time of cohabitation); Kozlowski v. Kozlowski, 403 A.2d 902 (NJ.
1979) (suit by female cohabitor against man with whom she lived for 15 years for future
support and payment for services rendered); Morone v. Morone, 413 N.E.2d 1154 (N.Y.
1980) (suit by woman to enforce oral contract for performing "housewifely" duties). Re-
gan's argument thus runs counter to that of Herman Hill Kay and Carol Amyx, who sug-
gest that "social planners should turn their attention to the possibility of creating and
strengthening institutional support for individuals entering into family relationships,
whether or not these relationships are marital ones." Herman Hill Kay & Carol Amyx,
Marvin v. Marvin: Preserving the Options, 65 CAL. L. REv. 937, 975 (1977).
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give incentives to marry by encouraging the idea that obligation in
certain instances can arise from the fact of relationship itself.93
D. Regan's Test of the Status Model
At this point, Regan uses his analysis of intimacy to discuss cur-
rent issues in family law, specifically spousal rape and presumptions of
legitimacy.94 He argues that courts and legislatures err when they
treat marital rape with less gravity than sexual assault by strangers.95
In fact, he points out that the injury resulting from marital rape may
be greater than that resulting from other rapes because of the betrayal
of trust and exploitation of the wife's vulnerability. 96
Regan then turns to a discussion of presumptions of legitimacy,
defending the Supreme Court's decision in Michael H. v. Gerald D.97
At the time, California presumed a child in wedlock to be the legiti-
mate child of the husband and wife. In Michael H., however, the child
was not the biological child of the husband but rather of the wife's
lover. The Supreme Court upheld California's conclusive presump-
tion of legitimacy, even where it precluded the married woman's lover
from establishing his paternity.98 Regan supports this decision by rea-
soning that the husband's willingness to raise the child expressed a
commitment both to the child and to his marriage.99 A paternity pre-
sumption respects this commitment by insulating spouses and the
marriage from having to deal with the adulterous third party. Putting
the father in his model, Regan notes that the natural father was an
93 REGAN, supra note, 3, at 126.-
94 Id. at 129-37.
95 Id. at 130.
96 Id. at 129-31. Although I am completely sympathetic with the conclusions Regan
draws, I am a little puzzled by Regan's citation of Hale's famous statement concerning
marital rape. Id. at 130' (citing M. HALF, I THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 628
(1st American ed. 1847)). Hale believed that when a woman married, she provided her
irrevocable consent to sexual relations with her husband. It would therefore be a logical
impossibility for a court to find a husband guilty of raping his wife. Id. Although Regan
says the statement meant that the wife was her husband's property, the wife, as well as the
husband, has a cause of action for divorce if the husband refuses intercourse. Further, at
least one statute makes joining religious sects that advocate celibacy a special ground for
divorce, since these vows revoke the mutual consent. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 458:7 (1993);
see also Diemer v. Diemer, 168 N.E.2d 654 (N.Y. 1960) (husband entitled to divorce on
grounds of abandonment when wife refused sexual relations on religious grounds). As far
as I can gather, Hale meant that by marrying the man, she had given a type of blanket
consent, thereby removing an essential element of the crime. Since at that time no divorce
was possible, she did not have any ability to revoke the consent. Through his marital vows,
the husband likewise would give his consent to intercourse at the pleasure of the wife, but
he usually would be reluctant to admit her greater interest in intercourse, and would not
be physically threatened.
97 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
98 REGAN, supra note 3, at 131-37.
99 Id. at 134. Of course, the wife could have rebutted the presumption of legitimacy
as well. As Regan points out, it takes two to make the preference happen. Id- at 134-35.
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"acontextual rights-bearer" because he sought to "vindicate his own
interest" despite the "web of relationships" affected by his actions.100
In Regan's view, the individual rights approach advocated by the dis-
sent in Michael H. was thus "insensitive to the complex layers of inter-
dependence that characterize these intimate relationships."10 1
Regan next considers whether no-fault divorce laws threaten mar-
ital intimacy. 102 He notes several problems: that the bitterness of di-
vorce disputes may simply transfer to other things such as property
division, payment of support, or custody and visitation; 03 that divorce
may cause opportunism during the marriage; 0 4 and that divorce
sends a bad "message that society is indifferent about marital miscon-
duct."10 5 Regan concludes that most couples would agree on minimal
standards of marital conduct. 10 6 The option of a fault-based divorce
should be available when a spouse feels that a genuine abuse of trust
100 Id. at 135. The "rights" approach, as opposed to viewing the family as a whole, is
criticized by Schneider, supra note 1, at 1858.
101 REGAN, supra note 3, at 135. The same result can be reached by looking not at the
commitment of the husband who wishes to raise the child (or his desire not to "deal with
the third party"), but rather at the perspective of the child. Most children would thrive
better in a stable two-parent family than in an unusual relationship with two father figures.
Many of the crises in child abuse, foster care, and adoption might be alleviated if we fo-
cused less on the rights of parents, important though they undoubtedly are, and more on
the risk of harm to children. Surely abuse of children in a family setting is just as violative
of trust and exploitative of vulnerability as is marital rape. See generally Margaret L. Eg-
ginton & Richard E. Hobbs, Comment, Termination of Parental Rights in Adoption Cases: Focus-
ing on the Child, 14J. F m. L. 547, 550-58 (1975-76) (discussing what is meant by the "best
interests of the child"). Courts, and particularly the Supreme Court, seem focused on
parental rights at the expense of children's. See, e.g., Smith v. Organization of Foster Fami-
lies for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816 (1977) (review procedure for administrative
decisions to transfer children from foster homes not constitutionally deficient simply be-
cause it is available only at foster parents' request; children's due process interest is small
because "it is difficult to see what right or interest of the foster child is protected by hold-
ing a hearing to determine whether removal would unduly impair [a child's] emotional
attachments to a foster parent who does not care enough about the child to contest the
removal"); May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953) (custody decrees from court without
personal jurisdiction over a parent do not require "full faith and credit;" personal jurisdic-
tion is required "to deprive [a] mother of her personal right to... immediate possession"
of her children); In re Clausen, 501 N.W.2d 193 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993) (Michigan court has
no jurisdiction to intervene in a custody dispute and must honor an Iowa court order,
notwithstanding the Iowa court's failure to analyze the "best interests of the child").
102 REGAN, supra note 3, at 137-43.
103 Id. at 139 (citing Carl E. Schneider, Rethinking Alimony: Marital Decisions and Moral
Discourse, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REv. 197, 243.
104 Id. at 139 (citing Margaret F. Brinig & Steven M. Crafton, Opportunism in Marriage,
23J. LEGAL S-&rD. 869 (1994)). In this study we suggest that creating divorce laws where
fault is irrelevant for any purpose may lead to fewer and later marriages, reduced invest-
ment in children, and more negative behavior such as spouse abuse. See also TREAT-SE ON
FAMILY, supra note 31, at 226-34 (arguing that no-fault divorce and efficient bargaining by
husbands and wives suggest that no-fault will hurt wives and children whose marriages are
broken up by their husbands).
105 REGAN, supra note 3, at 140.
106 Id.
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has occurred because these minimal standards were violated.10 7 For
example, instead of allowing the torts system'to redress physical inju-
ries, Regan suggests that the courts levy a financial penalty through
property and support determinations because in divorce "the mar-
riage as a whole is already under review."' 08
Regan suggests that the "clean break" approach to divorce, one
that involves property division rather than alimony, also has
problems.10 9 Even the more recent focus on human capital invest-
ment by spouses" ° is flawed because it focuses on "implicit costs and
benefits of each spousal interaction.""' A human capital approach
therefore "emphasizes voluntary rather than relational obligation."112
The spouse who is flexible in "enforcing" the original expectation,
rather than using some tit-for-tat strategy, has difficulty signaling that
marital obligations must be met in the future."l 3
107 Id. at 141. For example, New York provides for fault-based divorce on several
grounds, including cruel and inhuman treatment, abandonment and adultery. See N.Y.
DOM. REL. LAw § 170 (McKinney 1988).
108 REGAN, supra note 3, at 143. This coincides with Steve Crafton's and my recommen-
dations, and those of the-then President of the American Bar Association Family Law Sec-
tion. SeeBrinig & Crafton, supra note 104, at n.128; Harvey Golden & Michael Taylor, Fault
Enforces Accountability, 10 FAM. Anvoc. 11 (1987).
109 REGAN, supra note 3, at 143. This "clean break" concept was the focus of many of
the family law reform efforts of the 1970s. See, e.g., Herma Hill Kay, An Appraisal of Califor-
nia's No-Fault Divorce Law, 75 C.- L. REV. 291, 313 (1987). It remains influential today.
See, e.g., Ira M. Ellman, The Theory of Alimony, 77 CAL. L. REv. 1 (1989).
110 REGAN, supra note 3, at 146. This general concept originally stems from essays such
as those of JACOB MINCER, SCHOOLING, EXPERIENCE AND EARNINGS (1974); THEODORE W.
SCHULTZ, THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF EDUCATION (1963); and Jacob Mincer & Solomon Po-
lacheck, Family Investments in Human Capitak Earnings of Women, in ECONOMICS OF THE FAm-
ILY. MARRIAGE, CHILDREN, AND HUMAN CAPrrAL 397 (Theodore W. Schultz ed., 1974).
More recently, it has been popularized by Nobel Laureate Gary Becker and other econo-
mists. GARY BECKER, HUMAN CAPrrAL (1983); Robert E. Lucas, Jr., On the Mechanics of Eco-
nomic Developmen4 22 J. MONETARY ECON. 3 (1988); Paul M. Romer, Increasing Returns and
Long-Run Growth, 94J. POL. ECON. 1002 (1986). Some extended the concept specifically to
the investment in spouses. See ALLEN M. PAREMAN, No FAULT DIVORCE: WHAT WENT
WRONG? 31-41 (1992);Joan M. Krauskopf, RecompenseforFinancing Spouse's Education: Legal
Protection for the Marital Investor in Human Capita 28 KAN. L. REV. 379 (1980).
111 REGAN, supra note 3, at 146.
112 Id. Without fault, it is difficult to formulate a theory of alimony based on an expec-
tation that the married state (status) would continue. The only theory of alimony that
makes sense, therefore, is a reliance interest generated by specific investments or opportu-
nity costs incurred because of the marriage or children. Accordingly, I agree with Regan
that a voluntary or active set of promises is needed to generate support obligations under
the current system. The enforcement of the reliance interest will affect incentives to invest
in the marriage, however. See Carbone & Brinig, supra note 39, at 957-61.
113 REGAN, supra note 3, at 150. This is also a problem in other long-term relational
contracts. Once parties form a commercial contract and accept any nonconforming goods
or deviations from time schedules accepted, it is difficult to change behavior midstream.
See U.C.C. § 2-609 (1978) (insecure party may demand assurances of performance).
For examination of the tit-for-tat strategy, see Erin O'Hara, Social Constraint or implicit
Collusion?: Toward a Game Theoretic Analysis of Stare Decisis, 24 SETON HALL L. REv. 736
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Chapter six of Regan's book effectively deals with objections to
his use of status. 114 He anticipates two criticisms: first, that revival of
status will reinforce gender stereotypes and artificially intrude into a
realm that should be spontaneous; and second, that revival of status
will be ineffective in shaping behavior.115
Regan surmises that critics will raise the objection that status will
present an artificial intrusion into a realm that should be spontane-
ous. 1 6 Much of the book's earlier discussion demonstrates his reluc-
tance to place families at the whims of emotional states.117 In this
section of the book he argues further that even what we label as
nonvolitional emotions can be affected by group behavior or con-
text."" A person "must conceptually organize her sensory experience
into a meaningful pattern before she can properly be said to experi-
ence an emotion."" 9 If emotion is always experienced through the
filter of culture, 20 we are mistaken to assume that we can protect a
"natural" realm of emotions from the intrusion of artificial influ-
ences. 121 As Regan puts it, the "question that confronts us is what
context to choose."1 22
Regan next addresses the objection that law cannot affect behav-
ior.123 He argues that law does affect incentives and expectations.
Even though not all people are moved by the law, it does affect the
behavior of those people who are "at the margin." When social expec-
tations, codified in laws, render certain types of behavior expensive,
fewer people will engage in them.124 Regan notes, as has Elizabeth
(1994); Thomas C. Schelling, An Essay on Bargaining, 46 AM. ECON. REv. 281, 299-301
(1956).
114 REGAN, supra note 3, at 154-84.
115 Id. at 154.
116 Id.
117 Id. at chapters 5 & 6.
118 Id. at 169-70. Regan cites significant social science literature to support his theory.
In addition to his authorities, see Robyn Dawes et al., Cooperation for the Benefit of Us-Not
Me, or My Conscience, in BEYoND SFuF-I'rrEResT 97 (JaneJ. Mansbridge ed., 1990).
119 REGAN, supra note 3, at 170.
120 Id. at 173.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 174.
123 Id. at 176. The argument has the greatest force if people do not accurately predict
their own behavior. See Lynn A. Baker & Robert Emery, When Every Relationship is Above
Average: Perceptions and Expectations of Divorce At- the Time Of Marriage, 17 LAw & HUM.
BEHAV. 439, 444 (1993) ("[T]he most striking finding from the survey of marriage license
applicants was the discrepancy between their relatively accurate knowledge of the base
rates of divorce and its consequences and their disregard of these base rates when making
projections about their own futures.").
124 This is an important contribution of the law and economics movement, and is di-
rectly based upon the law of supply and demand. For example, Gary Becker has argued
that criminal punishments, and especially fines, do in fact deter some criminal behavior.
Gary Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968). See
also A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Optimal Use of Fines and Imprisonmen4 24J.
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Scott, that some divorces are triumphs of short-term desires over long-
term preferences for commitment.125 He continues with Scott's argu-
ment that the socially preferable result becomes more attractive if laws
require mandatory delays before divorce or financially disfavor some
divorce plaintiffs.126 Scott argues that "current divorce law vindicates
a vision of marriage as an arrangement for individual gratification to
which each partner makes a limited commitment."127 In the end, Re-
gan concludes that family law may not matter because of these incen-
tive-shaping effects. 128 Rather, the law may encourage internalization
of a different morality. 129 Returning to his now familiar theme, Regan
repeats that family status may create an individual "whose freedom of
action is circumscribed by one's relationship to others." 3 0
In his conclusion, Regan assures us that the family has the "capac-
ity to encourage the kind of human caring and sense of mutual re-
sponsibility for which the contemporary world cries out."13 1 He
speaks particularly to fathers, and reminds us that fatherhood is not a
role from which one can opt out.13 2 He argues that "the role of father
needs to be regarded... as part of who a man is, not as something
that he might perform when he feels like it."'13
As Regan puts it, we might use family law to promote child wel-
fare, not only by directly intervening in cases of harm, but also by
"fostering a substantive vision of family life that makes a father less
likely to inflict harm."134 He concludes by reconsidering the Victori-
ans who, despite their faults, recognized the need for deep-rooted
communal responsibility. 135 Perhaps even more than the Victorians,
modern Americans need to have homes and families to which to re-
turn because our "outside" life is so fragmented. Yet, unlike our nine-
PUB. ECON. 89 (1984) (fines are preferable to imprisonment in most cases); George J.
Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of Laws, 78J. PoLt ECON. 526 (1970) (relating the enforce-
ment of laws to the law of supply and demand). Carl Schneider calls this the channelling
function of law. Schneider, supra note 68, at 521-22.
125 REGAN, supra note 3, at 175 (discussing Elizabeth S. Scott, Rational Decisionmaking
About Marriage and Divorce 76 VA. L. R-v. 9 (1990)).
126 Id.
127 Id. Lloyd Cohen argued that without the punishment for marital misbehavior af-
forded under the fault system, the spouse with the least to lose from divorce would behave
opportunistically. Cohen, supra note 1, at 274-77. Steve Crafton and I tested this proposi-
tion empirically, and found it to be true. Brinig & Crafton, supra note 104, at 883-92.
128 REGAN, supra note 3, at 181.
129 Id.
130 Id. at 183.
131 Id. at 187 (citation omitted).
132 Id. at 188.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Id.
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teenth-century counterparts, we tend to conclude that "there is no
true place to which to return, no home now; if there ever was."13 6
Regan also points out the similarities between critics of relational
feminism (or the feminism of difference) and critics of his status ap-
proach.137 Critics of both relational feminism and status suggest that
"a focus on the similarity between men and women is likely to be more
successful in eradicating gender inequity.' 3 8 As Regan notes, how-
ever, "women have suffered not because the adoption of a relational
ethic is misguided, but because in important ways the culture has de-
valued that ethic."13 9 He notes that eventually the adoption of an
ethic of status will require a change in our self-image. 140 "[T ] he result
will be a conception of identity for both men and women that sees the
demands of freedom and relationship as complementary rather than
antagonistic." 141 A reconstruction of our model of identity would ac-
count for differences by insisting that we "recognize the full range of
human experience, and that we give at least as much weight to a rela-
tional ethic as we traditionally have given to an ethic of indepen-
dence."' 42 Regan argues that a new model of status would demand
"that those who typically enjoy more power within intimate relation-
ships must be accountable to those who are more dependent." 43
II
FROM STATUS TO CoNTRACT TO COVENANT
One criticism of Regan's book is that he is too apologetic about
his use of "status." Few of us would want to eradicate the concept
136 Id. (quoting Richard Sennet, Fragments Against the Ruin: Coping with an Unbounded
Present, TIMES LrrERARY SUPPLEMENT, Feb. 8, 1991, at 6).
137 REGAN, supra note 3, at 155-61. Advocates of relational feminism include NANCY
CHODOROW, THE REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING: PSYCHOANALYSIS AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF
GENDER (1978); FINEMAN, supra note 24; CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHO-
LOGICAL THEORY AND WOMAN'S DEVELOPMENT 24-63 (1982); Christine A. Littleton, Recon-
structing Sexual Equality, 75 CAL. L. Rav. 1279, 1285 (1987); Alice Rossi, A Biosocial Perspective
on Parenting, DAEDALUS 1, 25 (Spring 1977).
Of course, relational feminism depends upon women being psychologically or morally
different from men in meaningful ways. I am attempting currently to show this difference
in terms of altruism and risk aversion. Margaret F. Brinig, Comment on Jane Singer's Speciali-
zation and Efficiency, 82 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 1994).
138 REGAN, supra note 3, at 161. See, e.g., Catherine MacKinnon, Feminist Discourse,
Moral Values, and the Law-A Conversation, 34 BuFF. L. REV. 11, 20-21 (1985); Jean C. Wil-
liams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. Ray. 797, 836-43 (1989).
139 REGAN, supra note 3, at 155. See, e.g., Karen Czapanskiy, Volunteers and Draftees: The
Struggle for Parental Equality, 38 UCLA L. Rav. 1415, 1451-57 (1991) (suggesting that in
terms of their behavior as parents, society views women as being good parents out of a
sense of obligation, while men are to volunteer if they perform the same job).
140 REGAN, supra note 3, at 160.
'41 Id. at 162.
142 Id. at 164.
143 Id. at 165.
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entirely from American usage. Status clearly has value when we speak
of children, when we try to describe the basis of jurisdiction for di-
vorce, 144 or when we talk in terms of a "discrete and insular minority"
that should be given special protection under the law. 145 While Re-
gan's hesitation is understandable, a different paradigm would allevi-
ate his qualms and still reinvigorate our idea of the family.146
Regardless of whether we believe that status evokes sexism or ra-
cism, status does remind us of hierarchy. While position may con-
tinue to be an important part of the parent-child relationship,
hierarchical notions do not fit well with our modern ideal of matri-
mony as a union of two equals. Covenant, on the other hand, is a
concept that is gender and color neutral. The human parties to a
covenant may enjoy horizontal equality.147 However, unlike parties to
a contract, they are not interested in fairness, but rather are willing to
give beyond what is fair.' 48 Like Regan's notion of family in the con-
text of status, the family under the rubric of covenant extends beyond
144 Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 297-98 (1942).
145 U.S. v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 & n.4 (1938).
146 For example, it is somewhat troublesome to use concepts of contract when speak-
ing of status relationships. See, e.g., Gary Becker & Nigel Tomes, Human Capital and the Rise
and Fall of Families, 4J. LAz. ECON. 1 (1986) (using an economics model to chart the de-
cline of human capital in families); Gary S. Becker & Kevin M. Murphy, The Family and the
State, 31 J.L. & EcoN. 1 (1988) (regulation of family leads to more efficiency, unlike con-
ventional contracts). It is difficult to resurrect the Victorian term, with its roots in religious
revival, without their religious connotations as well. In Regan's world, religion does not
apparently perform an important role. For example, it is largely religious groups that have
objections to same-sex relationships. For example, the churches of the District of Colum-
bia for years have fought against repeal of the criminal sodomy statutes. Rene Sanchez,
D.C. Sodomy Law Is Off the Books; Congress Allows Repea Ending 12-Year Battle by Gay-Rights
Advocates, WASH. POST, Sept. 18, 1993, at B3.
147 Covenant relationships can be horizontal, as with husbands and wives who share
mutual obligations and benefits. Moore, supra note 6, at 171. Covenants may also be une-
qual partnerships "in which the power and authority of the covenantal partners is asymmet-
rical as are the responsibilities, obligations and rewards." SaEVEN T. KATz, JEwisH IDEAS
AND CONCEPTs 156 (1977). The more hierarchical relationship in the family is that be-
tween parent and child, although this contains elements of reciprocity as well. Even while
minors, children owe their parents obedience and affection in return for the support, gui-
dance and education the parents provide. Once the parents become aged and disabled or
otherwise disadvantaged, children have a moral (and sometimes a legal) responsibility to
care for the parents. See Margaret F. Brinig, Limited Horizons: The American Family, 2 INT'LJ.
OF CHILDnEN's RIGHTS 293 (1994).
148 This may be why spouses are unable to sue for support while in the marriage or
when they thought they were married. See, e.g., Cooper v. Cooper, 17 N.E. 892 (Mass.
1872); Alexander v. Kuykendall, 63 S.E.2d 746, 747 (Va. 1951). Both cases indicate that
marital services are performed out of love rather than out of hope for reward. The Biblical
parallel is to God's generosity even when what we are given, or what we accomplish in
return, may not be equal. See, e.g., Matt. 20: 1-16 (laborers in the vineyard all paid the daily
wage, even though they began at different times); see also Moore, supra note 6, at 172 (cit-
ingJon D. Levenson, Covenant and Commandment, 21 TRADrrION 42, 50 (1983) (discussing
Hebrew view of covenant between God and Israel, as expressed in the book of Joshua)).
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the nuclear arrangement. It includes such close relatives as grandpar-
ents and, ultimately, the whole community. 149
Both status and contract have their roles in Regan's vision of the
family. Similarly, I do not believe a concept of covenant always mis-
places a contract or law and economics analysis. Some aspects of fami-
lies make little sense without contractual analysis. For example, the
bargaining that takes place at the time of divorce or during antenup-
tial and separation agreements speaks more to contract than to a sta-
tus or covenant.150 Furthermore, unless a private welfare mentality
explains alimony, it is difficult to rationalize in a no-fault system with-
out looking at marriage through a contractual or law and economics
lens.151
Covenant, even better than status, explains why some aspects of
marriage and parenthood cannot be varied by contract. 152 For exam-
ple, spouses cannot contract around marriage's infinite duration, 153
nor can they avoid mutual support during the marriage. 54 Similarly,
parents cannot avoid entirely the duty of child support.155 Even when
the minor child marries or moves in with a boyfriend, the parent's
duty to support may revive if the child becomes indigent.156 Even
though divorce severs most marital obligations, many states require
spouses divorcing insane partners to continue their support
obligations. 157
149 As Everett states, "[plarenting should be the project, indeed, the covenant, of a
whole community." Everett, supra note 15, at 567. Moore points out that covenant "offers
possibilities for recontextalizing, and thus redefining, self-actualization through decision-
making and action." Moore, supra note 6, at 170. She suggests that "[fleminists and other
critical theorists should attend particularly to extracting the [covenant] paradigm's
emancipatory focus on equality and the common good." Id. Implicit in Moore's view is a
commitment to social generation of norms. Id. at 186-96. Cf. Katharine T. Bartlett, Femi-
nist LegalMethods, 103 HARV. L. REv. 829, 886 (1990) (calling for celebration and nurturing
of universal human dignity).
150 See, e.g., Margaret F. Brinig & Michael V. Alexeev, Trading at Divorce, 8 OHIO ST. J.
Disp. REsOL 279 (1993); Marjorie Z. Schultz, Contractual Ordering of Marriage: A New Model
for State Policy, 70 CAL- L. Rzv. 207 (1982).
151 See, e.g., Brinig & Carbone, supra note 41; Carbone & Brinig, supra note 39; Cohen,
supra note 1.
152 See, e.g., Reid v. Reid, 429 S.E.2d 208,211 (Va. 1998) (no restitution of alimony paid
under invalid decree).
153 See, e.g., In re Marriage of Dawley, 551 P.2d 323, 329-30 (Cal. 1976).
154 In re Marriage of Higgason, 516 P.2d 289, 296-97 (Cal. 1973), rev'd on other grounds
sub nom. In re Marriage of Dawley, 551 P.2d 323 (Cal. 1976).
155 See, e.g., Aig v. Alig, 255 S.E.2d 494 (Va. 1979); Huckaby v. Huckaby, 393 N.E.2d
1256 (Il1. Ct. App. 1971).
156 See, e.g., Wulff (Tierney) v. Wulff, 500 N.W.2d 845, 851 (Neb. 1993); Suire v. Miller,
363 So. 2d 945, 949 (La. Ct. App. 1978).
157 See, e.g., Am. CODEANN. § 9-12-301 (Michie 1993); CAL. CIv. CODE § 4510(b) (West
1988) (effective until Jan. 1, 1994); KA. STAT. ANN. § 60-1601 (1992); NEv. REv. STAT.
§ 125.101 (1993).
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The strict law and economics view of such terms is that non-con-
tractual obligations are default or off-the-rack provisions,158 or that
they substitute for what parties wanted ex ante.159 However, since both
the parties in question may not want these obligations, even ex ante,
law and economics does not completely answer the objection. 160
Some parts of family life, which I would attribute to covenant, are in-
variable because they are necessary for the family to meet its historical
and present-day societal obligations.161 They make the family what it
is: a set of relationships where intimacy and interdependence flour-
ish. Covenant thus explains, at least in part, why moving family law
too much toward individuality has large negative consequences. 162
Anticipating another objection, I also believe that the law is partly
aspirational.163 Although covenant, like contract or status, provides
only part of the picture for family law, it can guide our decisionmak-
ing, particularly in the legislative sphere. In other words, before we
reform laws, we need to look both at the incentives the new laws will
give and at the type of people they will ultimately shape. Before we
undertake family law reform on any large scale, we need to take a
hard look at the family in this aspirational sense. 164
Covenant, 65 in the sense I will use it here, describes a relation-
ship characterized by a special kind of love: one that is boundless and
158 See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Scott, Rational Decisionmaking about Marriage and Divorce 76 VA.
L. REv. 9 (1990) [hereinafter RationalDecisionmaking]; Robert E. Scott, Conflict and Coopera-
tion in Long-Term Contracts, 75 CAL. L. REv. 2005 (1987).
159 Cf Becker & Murphy, supra note 146 (arguing that many state obligations to family
intervention mimic the agreements that would occur if children arranged their own care).
160 This may be similar to the general contracts concept of unconscionability, which
has inspired a vast literature. See, e.g., Alan Schwartz, Unconscionability and Imperfect Informa-
tion: A Research Agenda, 19 CAN. Bus. L.J. 437 (1991).
161 In economic terms, these create positive externalities, or public goods for people
outside the family.
162 See, e.g., Brinig & Crafton, supra note 104.
163 See, e.g., Schneider, supra note 68, at 498 ("Law's expressive abilities may be used,
first to provide a voice in which citizens may speak and, second, to alter the behavior of
people that law addresses.").
164 I am pleased to see that the American Bar Association Section on Family Law is
doing so. One of its subcommittees, the Committee for the Reconsideration of Family, is
preparing a book length study of family law.
165 The Random House Dictionary of the English Language defines "covenant" as:
1. an agreement, usually formal, between two or more persons to do or
not do something specified...
4. (cap.) Hist.
a. See National Covenant.
b. Solemn League and Covenant.
5. Bible a. the conditional promises made to humanity by God, as re-
vealed in Scripture.
6. Law a. a formal agreement of legal validity, esp. one under seal ...
THE RANDOM HOUSE DicnoNARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 314 (1993). Moore writes that
covenant "embodies the creation of mutual commitment as people come together in a
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undeserved. 166 The person in a covenant relationship expects, with
justification, that it will go on forever. The intimacy that Regan seeks
flows naturally with this kind of love. Unlike the recent Longines
Christmas ads in which the donee always expects something more, the
person in covenant is pleased 167 by what the other gets. The emphasis
is upon giving rather than receiving, upon enjoying the gifts of others
rather than reveling in one's own. Covenant, then, describes altruism
in the framework of relationship. This is quite different from econo-
mist Gary Becker's definition of altruism, which he derives from a sin-
gle family member's caring.168 In addition to requiring only one
party, rather than the two or more needed for covenant, Becker's defi-
nition of altruism implies that the altruist must have the means to
withdraw support from the rest of the family.169
In a legal sense, a covenant frequently is an especially solemn
type of contract, one that cannot be broken without significant penal-
ties.' 70 A covenant, or promise under seal, will support a gift to a
third party where a simple contract would not.' 71 Covenant implies
donative intent and confers a benefit upon another. Each party will
always act for the other's good regardless of his or her behavior. Ac-
cordingly, once the parties make their initial assents, much of their
relationship, which becomes constitutive of their identities and so inherently valuable."
Moore, supra note 6, at 167. Covenant is defined by the "transforming nature of member-
ship" and can ground a policy of inclusion. 1d. at 168.
166 The Puritans, Cotton Mather, John Cotton, and John Winthrop, organized their
Massachusetts colony around their collective covenant. Everett, supra note 15, at 561. The
covenant was not just among the Puritans, but included God as well. "Thus stands the
cause betweene God and us. Wee are entered into Covenant with him for this worke .... "
Moore, supra note 6, at 160 (quoting John Winthrop, A Modell of Christian Charity, in 2
WINTHROP PAPERs" 292, 294 (Massachusetts Historical Society, 1931) (Sermon entitled
"Christian Charity" preached aboard The Arabela, Massachusetts Bay, 1630)). This cove-
nant was prompted by God's calling his subjects to be a "beacon to humanity," an agree-
ment to be "as a Citty upon a Hill." Winthrop, supra, at 294-95.
167 Or, as the economist would have it, his or her utility increases.
168 TREATISE ON FAmmy, supra note 31, at 288-96 ("Rotten Kid Theorem").
169 Id. at 172-202. Cf Ben-Porath, supra note 31, at 54 (criticizing this view and stating
that there must be outward direction on all sides).
170 In the early Hebraic world, a God active in human affairs was the guarantor of
covenants. Covenant-making erected a future of promises on the experience of God's past
providential mercy. Everett, supra note 15, at 562. The covenant related people to the
land. Id. Despite the numerous attempts by the Israelites to avoid their promises to
Yahweh, God remained faithful to them. This theme of unfaithfulness and constancy re-
curs throughout the historical books of the Bible and is particularly obvious in the writings
of the prophet Hosea, who uses the imagery of husband and wife. See Hosea 11:8-9, 14:4-5
(Revised Standard Version); see also William J. Everett, Shared Parenthood in Divorce: The
Parental Covenant and Custody Law, 2 J.L. & RELIC. 85, 85-99 (1984). When the modem
promise under seal is enforced, the appropriate remedy is expectation damages. See Mel-
vin Eisenberg, Donative Promises, 47 U. CH. L. REv. 1 (1979).
171 MICHAEL TREBILCOcK, THE LIMrrs OF FREEDOM OF CoNTRAcr 12 (1993); Lon Fuller,
Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REv. 799, 799 (1941).
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behavior is constrained by the covenant.172 Everett suggests, for ex-
ample, that covenant "had elements of both imposition and volunta-
rism within the partnership with land and with past and future
generations. Covenant formed a web of relationships between the
God of history, the people, and the land."173 In a way, once the cove-
nant is made, more than the two people are involved. The imprima-
tur of the state (or God) is placed upon the solemn promise. 174
III
TESTING THE COVENANT MODEL
To test the covenant model in terms of how it comports with
practical and aspirational standards, we must reexamine Regan's hard
cases involving same sex couples,175 cohabitants, 76 and natural fa-
thers of children born during the mother's marriage to another.177
Regan's argument is that the gay or lesbian couple frequently seeks to
172 Everett suggests, for example, that "parenthood is a participation in the covenant
with God, who presides over the generations of our history on the land. Both parents
participate in that covenant as parents, not as spouses. Therefore, upon the failure of the
marriage this covenant cannot be dissolved summarily and reconstructed by the courts."
Everett, supra note 15, at 566. See also Carbone & Brinig, supra note 39, at 1005-08 (uncou-
pling childrearing from marriage). As Moore writes, covenant, in contrast to contract, is
"literally more than is bargained for," creating "individual-in-community and, as that rela-
tionship becomes constitutive of subjective identity, community-in-individual." Moore,
supra note 6, at 168.
173 Everett, supra note 15, at 563.
174 For example, in his descriptions of indissoluble marriage, Pope Paul VI did not use
the term "contract," but only "covenant," showing the strong emphasis upon conjugal love.
See Morrisey, Proposed Changes in Canonical Matrimonial Legislation, 20 CATH. LAiw. 30, 31
(1974); see alsOJOSEPH L. ALLEN, LOVE AND CoNFLcr: A COVENANTAL MODEL OF CHISTIAN
ETHics 17 (1984) (stating that the covenant model does not involve seeing a relationship as
one of "bargaining ... in which the rights and obligations of each person are limited to
what has been agreed to .. . in the bargain"). Older religious discussions of covenant
appear in 2 Cor. 3:6 (God has made us competent to be ministers of a new covenant);
Genesis 9:8-17 (covenant with Noah); Hosea 2:19-23 (opposed to unfaithfulness); 1 Kings
8:16; Psalms 89:1; 2 Solomon 7:9-37 (Davidic covenant). See also Miller, supra note 11, at 23-
27 (Esau gives up his birthright).
The covenant between citizens and government is described in DANIEL ELAZAR, AMERI-
CAN FEDERALISM: A VIEW FROM THE STATES 3 (1984). Additionally, Moore notes that ele-
ments are shared by the Puritan and Judaic notions of covenant:
The first, akin to hesed is a deep awareness of human dependence on divine
grace, the 'good not our own.' The second, akin to mitsvo is the possibility
that a freely chosen relationship can become so constitutive of one's iden-
tity as to transform action from banal to meaningful and even sacral.
Moore, supra note 6, at 176. The relationship between the transformed self and the com-
munity is discussed at length by Regan in Chapter 3, entitled Postmodern Personal Life as in
many ways a loss of self. REGAN, supra note 3, at 68-88.
175 REGAN, supra note 3, at 119-22, 152.
176 Id. at 123-27.
177 Id. at 131-37.
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make a commitment 78 and that their relationships would be more
stable if society permitted legal ties. 179
Covenant would also afford stability in states that do not prohibit
the underlying sexual conduct. If the state continues to proscribe sex-
ual expression between non-heterosexual couples,180 government it-
self constrains the relationship.' 8 ' The same-sex couple cannot
enforce any explicit relationship-related contract because of the ille-
gality of the relationship. 8 2 However, the couple can make the per-
manent commitment and exhibit the selfless loving and giving
required for a covenant. Some religious groups are now sanctioning
such exchanges, 83 and Regan notes that some localities are passing
domestic partner legislation.' 8 4
Similarly, the lens of covenant reveals the same problems with
cohabiting couples that Regan demonstrates. 8 5 Many heterosexual
178 Id. at 120. See, e.g., Adoption of Robert Paul P., 471 N.E.2d 424 (N.Y. 1984) (deny-
ing petition to gay man to adopt his partner).
179 REGAN, supra note 3, at 121-22.
180 This was true in 28 states at the time of Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196
(1986). See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1984).
181 See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
182 See, e.g., Jones v. Daly, 176 Cal. Rptr. 130 (Ct. App. 1981) (striking same-sex
couples' cohabitation agreement due to illicit meretricious consideration). Cf. Whorton v.
Dillingham, 248 Cal. Rptr. 405 (Ct. App. 1988) (severing sexual component of the consid-
eration for cohabitation agreement).
183 See, e.g., Richard Natale, Commitments; The New Protocol; Gay Couples Who Want to Get
MarriedFace the Same Dilemmas That Confront Anyone WhoPlans a Wedding LL. TIMEsJune 6,
1994, at E3 (discussing clergy acknowledgement of same sex marriages); Deb Price, Times
Have Changed, But Not Enough, S.F. ExAM, June 21, 1994, at B7 (same). Cf Brad Bonhall,
Partners For Life: Gays in O.C. Are Increasingly Confirming Their Unions Before Family and
Friends. But Clergy Remains Split on the Ceremonies, L.. TIMFS, Feb. 13, 1994, at El (discuss-
ing controversy over whether clergy should acknowledge same sex marriages); Other News
To Note, HOUSTON POST, Feb. 26, 1994, at E4 (stating that the Mormon religion opposes
same sex unions).
184 REGAN, supra note 3, at 123. The Hawaii legislature has found that Hawaii's mar-
riage licensing laws "were originally and are presently intended to apply only to male-fe-
male couples, not same-sex couples." 1994 Haw. Sess. Laws 217, § 1. At the same time, in
§ 6, the bill establishes a commission on sexual orientation and the law to examine
whether benefits extended to heterosexual couples should also be extended to their same-
sex counterparts, and to recommend appropriate legislation. 1994 Haw. Sess. Laws 217,
§ 6.
185 Obviously there are various "flavors" of cohabiting couples. Regan and I both refer
to the largely middle class phenomenon of "trial marriages" or situations where couples
live together without marrying in order to escape the marriage obligations. We do not
mean to imply that all couples who cohabit cannot be committed, do not have children, or
cannot think of the relationship as permanent. There are obviously those who cannot
marry because they cannot afford divorces from prior spouses or cannot do without bene-
fits, public or otherwise, that depend upon their not being married. The statistics, how-
ever, reveal that of all cohabiting couples, the average length of the relationship is 18
months. Of divorcing couples alone, the average length of marriage is seven years. See
REGAN, supra note 3, at 227 n.43; Teitelbaum, supra note 25, at 1813 (discussing lengths of
marriages); Yoram Weiss & Robert J. Willis, Transfers Among Divorced Couples: Evidence and
Interpretation, 11 J. LAz. ECON. 629 (1993) (same); D'Vera Cohn, Cohabitating Couples Are a
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partners that do not marry either deliberately avoid marriage because
of its constraints or use cohabitation as a screening function for a later
marriage. 186 Although many cohabitation relationships endure suc-
cessfully for long periods of time, they are clearly less stable than mar-
riage, if only because the parties expect their relationship to last only
so long as they "love" each other. Thus, emotional "highs" are even
more important than in marriages, and are often a euphemism for
infatuation. 187 The couple, even more than the modem married
couple, never ends the courtship behavior of looking appraisingly at
every potential alternative mate. 188 There is no unequivocal "retire-
ment" from the marriage market. Finally, most (although not all) of
these couples refrain from having children, or, as my aunt calls them,
little anchors. For the most part, then, cohabitating couples have no
permanent commitment to each other or to a lifetime of co-
parenting. 8 9
Finally, we can look at the situation of the unwed father.190 He is
increasingly litigating his plight by arguing for his lost parental
rights. 191 Although there are undoubtedly exceptions to the rule,
most unwed fathers are unwilling to make the commitment necessary
for fatherhood. 192 This may be simply because the unwed father lacks
connection to the child's mother. Particularly if we look in terms of
Settled Bunch, WASHINGTON POST, March 20, 1994, at B1 (citing 1987-88 National Survey of
Families and Households and its finding that "most cohabitations don't last long").
186 See Rational Decisionmaking, supra note 158, at 88-89.
187 REGAN, supra note 3, at 118-28.
188 See, e.g., Gary Becker et al., An Economic Analysis of Marital Instabiliy, 85 J. PoL
EcoN. 1141 (1977); William Bishop, Is He Married? Signalling Behavior, 25 U. TORONTO L.
(1982).
189 See Schneider, supra note 68, at 520-22 (arguing that the current legal position
toward cohabitants as urging them toward marriage). Cf Barbara Dafoe Whitehead, Dan
Quayle Was Right: Harmful Effects of Divorce on Children, 271 THE ATLAnrIc 47 (April 1993)
(discussing various studies revealing the negative short and long term effects of divorce on
children).
190 See, e.g., REGAN, supra note 3, at 131-39.
191 See, e.g., Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 2482 (1972); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645
(1972); DeBoer v. Schmidt, 501 N.W.2d 193 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993); Robert O. v. Russell K.,
578 N.Y.S.2d 594 (App. Div.), aff'd, 604 N.E.2d 99 (N.Y. 1990); Augusta Co. Dep't Soc.
Serv. v. Unnamed Mother, 348 S.E.2d 26 (Va. Ct. App. 1986).
192 See Everett, supra note 15; McCant, supra note 26; Schneider, supra note 68, at 526-
28. California's rule can be seen as buttressing a version of marriage and a view of
parenthood, and disadvantaging the alternative institution. Schneider, supra note 68, at
528. Woodhouse, supra note 29, at 1772-75, discusses Joseph of Nazareth as the "most
richly symbolic of gestational fathers." Id. at 1773.
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what is best for the child in such situations, 193 the two parent alterna-
tive is usually more attractive. 94
CONCLUSION
Family Law and the Pursuit of Intimacy is a book that makes us think
not just about families but about who we are as people. It disturbs us,
stretches us, and challenges us. Whether we settle on Regan's para-
digm of status or the covenant alternative, we need to rethink the ef-
fects and the message of modern family law. We need to encourage
responsibility in ways that do not promote or suggest gender or racial
inequality. We need to make appropriate concessions to pluralism
without losing all moral sense. In short, as a society we need to return
to the intimacy Regan promotes in this worthwhile book.
193 The outcome of court proceedings involving children often depends upon ajudi-
cial determination of the child's best interests. See, e.g., Flowers v. Cain, 237 S.E.2d 111
(Va. 1977); Malpass v. Morgan, 192 S.E.2d 794 (Va. 1972).
194 See Woodhouse, supra note 29, at 1814 (parenthood is stewardship, not ownership).
See also Katharine Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98 YALE LJ. 293, 294-95 (1988) (advo-
cating a focus on each parent-child relationship, focusing "on parental responsibility
rather than reciprocal rights").
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